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UNCONSTITUTIONAL HOSTING OF
THE SUPER BOWL: ANTI-AMBUSH
MARKETING CLEAN ZONES’
VIOLATION OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is
practiced. . . . If there be time to expose through discussion
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.
Such . . . is the command of the Constitution. It is therefore
always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free
speech and assembly by showing that there was no emergency
justifying it.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Football League (NFL) is the premier sports entity in the
United States. Since the Super Bowl, the NFL’s championship game, began in
1967,2 the now international spectacle has grown to new heights. In 2011,
Super Bowl XLV, between the Green Bay Packers and Pittsburgh Steelers,
drew 111 million viewers nationwide, surpassing the 106.5 million viewers
nationwide who tuned in to Super Bowl XLIV, which bested the previously
most-watched program, the “M*A*S*H” series finale.3
Even more
astounding is that the Super Bowl, as of 2009, is televised in 232 countries
worldwide.4
However, success breeds tension. From 2005 through 2009, the top three
1. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
2. Super Bowl History, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/superbowl/history (last visited Feb. 21,
2011).
3. Ben Klayman, Super Bowl Packs in Record U.S. TV Viewer Total, REUTERS.COM (Feb. 7,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/07/us-superbowl-ratings-idustre7163GS20110207.
4. Superbowl XLIII and Superbowl Fun Facts, THENFLTHISWEEK (Feb. 1, 2009), http:/
/thenflthisweek.com/superbowl-xliii-and-superbowl-fun-facts/.
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Super Bowl advertising spenders were all competitors of official NFL
sponsors.5 The Super Bowl broadcasting rights-holder is permitted to sell the
television commercial spaces to anyone willing to pay the enormous $3
million rate for thirty seconds.6 Nonofficial sponsors view the Super Bowl as
an opportunity to spotlight highly creative commercials to more than 111
million people. If the NFL required the Super Bowl broadcasting rightsholder to sell advertising space only to official NFL sponsors, the broadcasting
rights-holder would likely be paying millions less in rights fees because
significantly fewer businesses would be permitted to buy advertising time;
therefore, the supply would be greater, the demand lower, and advertising
prices would drop proportionately from the approximately $3 million for a
thirty-second commercial currently costs.7
This Comment focuses mostly on the NFL’s conduct in protecting the
Super Bowl and its own official sponsors from ambush marketing tactics.
Sports entities, like the NFL, may have a contractual obligation to official
sponsors to reasonably protect against ambush marketing.8 In fact, “[p]rudent
sponsors negotiate contractual provisions that reduce the sponsorship fees
payable in the event sponsorship rights are devalued. Contractual provisions
are also important for providing sponsors with the first option to become
sponsors of the broadcast coverage and on other media, such as the official
website.”9 Some sports entities find it necessary to educate the public about
ambush marketing and how such ambushers can break the law, as the
Federation of International Football Association (FIFA) does for the World
Cup.10
To curb nonsponsor activity on location at the Super Bowl, the NFL has
seemingly decided to use a grassroots approach. In its bid package sent to

5. Most Super Bowl Viewers Tune in for the Commercials Nielsen Says, NIELSEN (Jan. 20, 2010),
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/press-room/2010/most_super_bowl_viewers.html (the top
three advertisers were Bud Light, Budweiser, and Coca-Cola; their NFL official-sponsor competitors
were Coors Light and Pepsi).
6. Marketers Look to Super Bowl Pregame With In-Game Inventory Sold, SPORTS BUS. J. DAILY
(Feb.
3,
2011),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2011/02/3/Marketing-andSponsorship/SB-Ads.aspx.
7. See Id.
8. See SIMON GARDINER ET AL., SPORTS LAW 469 (3d ed. 2006).
9. Id.; see Steve McKelvey & John Grady, Ambush Marketing: The Legal Battleground for Sport
Marketers, 21 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 8, 14 (2004).
10. See THE FIFA RIGHTS PROTECTION PROGRAMME AT THE 2010 FIFA WORLD CUP SOUTH
AFRICA (2010). http://es.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/marketing/01/18/98/99/march2010
rightsprotectio n_a5_20100308.pdf (educated the public by posting an informational brochure about
the event’s rights and protection on the event website).
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potential Super Bowl host cities, the NFL requires that the host city enact an
ordinance prohibiting “temporary signs, inflatables and buildings wrapped
with advertising banners” in an area covering a one mile radius around the
stadium site during Super Bowl week.11 The NFL likely makes this a
necessity for hosting a Super Bowl to prevent ambush marketing and preserve
the value of its official sponsorships, among other reasons. Furthermore, the
NFL can legally make such a requirement without directly infringing on
commercial speech freedoms by encouraging the host city to enact a
temporary clean-zone ordinance prohibiting signage and advertising.12
Although the NFL would likely argue that such clean-zone ordinances are for
the purpose of furthering aesthetic and safety interests surrounding the Super
Bowl,13 based on North Texas’ Bid Summary, it could be speculated that the
main purpose and interest for enacting the clean-zone ordinances is to protect
the Super Bowl and the NFL official sponsors against ambush marketing.14
Super Bowl XLV seemingly went by without any issues or challenges as it
related to the clean-zone ordinances in Arlington and Fort Worth, Texas—
except for some minor confusion as to how the ordinance would be enforced.15
However, if a future Super Bowl host city enacts an ordinance that matches
exactly what the NFL asks for in its bid package, as Fort Worth did, those
cities should also be prepared for constitutional challenges to such clean-zone
ordinances.
This Comment will begin by exploring the meaning of ambush marketing,
its relation to consumer confusion pursuant to the Lanham Act,16 and actual
examples of its practice through case law. Part II will provide an analysis of
how legislators have acted to control the ambush marketing practice; both
domestic and foreign legislation will be discussed. Although the Lanham Act
will likely not be a factor in determining the constitutionality of the clean-zone
ordinances, the Act is necessary to understand how certain types of ambush
marketing tactics are illegal in the United States. Part III will review
11. Arlington Addresses NFL’s Needs in 2011 Super Bowl Bid, SPORTS BUS. J. DAILY (Apr. 13,
2007), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/111100 (citation omitted).
12. See ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 10-095 (2011) (repealed 2011); FORT WORTH, TEX.,
ORDINANCE NO. 19492-12-2010 (2010) (repealed 2011).
13. Telephone Interview with Dave Weinberg, Legal Counsel, NFL (Nov. 11, 2010).
14. See Super Bowl Bid Summary, N. TEX. SUPER BOWL XLV HOST COMMITTEE 62–63 (2008),
available
at
http://www.star-telegram.com/Multimedia/News/Super%20Bowl%20bid2.pdf
[hereinafter North Texas Bid Summary].
15. Monika Diaz, Businesses Confused by Super Bowl ‘Clean Zones’, WFAA.COM, (Jan. 29,
2011), http://www.wfaa.com/news/local/City-NFL-clean-zones-cause-confusion-for-business-owners
-114845989.html.
16. See generally Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2011).
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municipal ordinances that have been upheld or struck down for violating the
First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. Part IV will discuss the
NFL’s policy requiring Super Bowl host cities to enact an anti-ambush
marketing clean-zone ordinance as well as Fort Worth, Texas’ enacted (and
now repealed) clean-zone ordinance. Lastly, Part V will present a case for
whether Super Bowl host city clean-zone ordinances may or may not infringe
upon commercial freedoms of speech.
II. AMBUSH MARKETING AND CONSUMER CONFUSION
Imagine that a business paid millions of dollars to be associated with a
major sports entity and gained the full benefits of association, such as use of
the entity’s name, likeness, and marks; signage rights and sampling
opportunities at the entity’s major events; and many more similar benefits.
Now imagine if the business’ major competitor put up signage and a tent
outside the event’s facility to market its own products to consumers as they
entered or walked around the facility. This is just a minor example of how
ambush marketing can take place in the sports industry.
Ambush marketing occurs at every level of sport. One of the earliest and
most well-known ambush marketing tactics took place at the international
level through the telecast of the Olympic Games. Visa was the official credit
card of the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona, Spain.17 American
Express, “to counter Visa’s advertisement of its wide acceptance at the
Olympics,” bought a considerable amount of commercial space on major
television networks leading up to and during the Olympics.18 American
Express did not use any symbol, logo, or word registered to the International
Olympic Committee, but certainly suggested a competitive attitude against
Visa—and an indirect association with the Olympic Games—by stating in its
advertising, “In Spain, you won’t need a Visa.”19
There are numerous ways to define ambush marketing, and no one
definition is all-inclusive. One way to explain the practice is when businesses
advertise around a certain event, or organized professional or amateur sport or
team, without paying rights fees to be an official sponsor and, therefore, be

17. DOYICE J. COTTEN & JOHN T. WOLOHAN, LAW FOR RECREATION AND SPORT MANAGERS
626 (5th ed. 2010); see also Edward Vassallo, et al., An International Look at Ambush Marketing, 95
TRADEMARK REP. 1338, 1338 (2005) (explaining the same tactic used against Visa for the 1994
Winter Olympics in Norway).
18. Lori L. Bean, Note, Ambush Marketing: Sports Sponsorship Confusion and the Lanham Act,
75 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1103 (1995).
19. Id. at 1104.
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officially associated with the sports entity.20 These businesses use ambush
marketing tactics to unofficially associate themselves with the entity,
potentially leading to a likelihood of consumer confusion and weakening of
any official sponsorship’s value.21 Another definition is a company’s
intention to “capitalize on the goodwill, reputation and popularity of a
particular sport or event by creating an association without the authorization or
consent of the necessary parties” and not an intention to directly weaken a
competitor’s official sponsorship value.22 No matter how one defines it,
ambush marketing is a prevalent concern that many sports entities must deal
with to protect not only their own trademarks and goodwill, but their official
sponsorship values as well.
No matter how ambush marketing is defined, its practice has generally
been upheld in courts, although there are exceptions.23 The Lanham Act has
been commonly applied to ambush marketing cases because the most logical
argument about ambush marketing is that it creates a likelihood of consumer
confusion as to who is actually associated with the sports entity.24
A. The Lanham Act
The Lanham Act provides sports entities with legal remedies from
trademark infringement and misappropriation of goodwill.25 For example, the
NFL might bring a claim under the Lanham Act if a nonofficial sponsor’s
conduct creates a mistaken belief in consumers’ minds that the company is
associated or endorsed by the NFL. The Lanham Act’s primary purpose in
regulating trademark law is to limit consumer confusion in the marketplace by
punishing unfair competition and false advertising through unauthorized use of
another’s marks.26 To be deemed liable under the Lanham Act, the claim’s
20. See McKelvey & Grady, supra note 9, at 8–9.
21. See id.; Anita M. Moorman & T. Christopher Greenwell, Consumer Attitudes of Deception
and the Legality of Ambush Marketing Practices, 15 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 183, 184 (2005)
(citations omitted); Bean, supra note 18, at 1100.
22. McKelvey & Grady, supra note 9, at 9.
23. See, e.g., NFL v. Gov. of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977).
24. See, e.g., id.; see also NHL v. Pepsi-Cola Can., Ltd. (1992) 70 B.C.L.R. 2d 27 (Can. B.C.
Sup. Ct.).
25. Moorman & Greenwell, supra note 21, at 185.
26. Id.; see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2011); Bean, supra note 18, at 1110 (stating that
The primary purposes of trademark law are to: (1) ‘identify one seller’s goods and
distinguish them from goods sold by others[;]’ (2) signify that all goods bearing the
trademark come from a single source and are of an equal level of quality; and (3) act as an
instrument in the advertising and selling of goods. Trademark law also protects the mark
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proponent—likely a sports entity in sports-related ambush marketing cases—
must show that the defendant-ambusher was not authorized to use the
proponent’s registered mark(s),27 and that the unauthorized use created a
likelihood of consumer confusion.28 If there is no agreement between the
parties allowing the defendant ambusher to use the plaintiff entity’s
trademarks (e.g. logos, name), then it is likely that the defendant ambusher
was not authorized to use the plaintiff entity’s marks. Likelihood of confusion
is shown by a possibility of a public misconception that the mark’s owner
approved the ambusher’s use of the entity’s trademark; however, no actual
confusion is required to find the defendant ambusher liable under the Act.29
A sports entity, like the NFL, which believes its sponsorship rights have
been exploited by ambush marketing tactics may look to the Lanham Act
when seeking remedies.30 The issue with applying the Lanham Act to ambush
marketers is that smart and successful ambushers will likely not use the
entity’s exact logo or other registered mark.31 The Lanham Act is not likely to
protect a business entity mark when ambushers either do not use the mark or
merely use a comparable mark or reference in their advertising.32 For
example, when a nonofficial sponsor creates a sweepstakes in December and
January for consumers to win tickets to “the Big Game,” consumers know it is
referring to the Super Bowl without the nonofficial sponsor actually using a
NFL mark.
For example, in 1976, the State of Delaware began a lottery program
where lottery purchasers could bet each week on NFL games.33 There were
three different lottery games available throughout the season, and their basic
purpose was for lottery players to pick at least three teams to win each week;
the participant would win if he picked all the correct winners.34 In addition to

as an objective symbol of a business’ good will.);

Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A
Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1992) (stating that the Lanham Act’s
purpose is to prevent competitors from deceiving consumers who act on the false advertising)
(citations omitted).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
29. Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204–05 (2d Cir.
1979).
30. Moorman & Greenwell, supra note 21, at 185.
31. See id. at 186.
32. Id.
33. NFL, 435 F. Supp. at 1375–76.
34. Id. at 1376.
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other claims, the NFL argued that Delaware violated the Lanham Act by using
the NFL schedule to create a lottery game, and benefited from such conduct
while infringing on the NFL’s trademark rights.35 The court held that because
the lottery tickets did not use any NFL team nickname or any other NFL
registered mark, the fact that the lottery used only the team’s city name did not
“constitute infringement of [the NFL’s] registered marks or unfair
competition.”36
Alternatively, the court held that a business may not advertise its products
in such a manner that would create confusion in the consumer’s mind that the
product is somehow associated with, or endorsed by, the registered markholder when no association or endorsement actually exists.37 The court held
that the Delaware Lottery violated the Lanham Act due to a showing by the
NFL that a substantial percentage of the NFL audience in Delaware was
actually, or was likely to be, confused about whether the Delaware Lottery
was officially associated with or endorsed by the NFL.38 The court ruled that
one-fifth of the survey participants constituted substantial confusion because
21% of NFL fans “either said that, as far as they knew, the legalized betting on
professional football was arranged by the State with the authorization of the
teams or said that it was conducted by the teams alone.”39 After finding
substantial confusion amongst consumers, the court required the Delaware
Lottery to put a prominent and clear disclaimer on every lottery ticket, and in
all advertising, that the lottery program was in no way associated with or
authorized by the NFL.40 Unfortunately for the NFL, this remedy was not as
severe as it argued for; the NFL wanted the court to grant a full injunction on
the entire lottery program as it related to the NFL games.41
National Football League v. Governor of the State of Delaware illustrates
that businesses may benefit and profit from the NFL’s popularity without, at
least in this case, arising to misappropriation.42 The business must merely
provide a clear and prominent disclaimer that states the business and product
are not affiliated with or sponsored by the NFL, as other courts have ruled.43
35. Id. at 1380.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2011).
38. NFL, 435 F. Supp. at 1380–81.
39. Id. at 1381.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1376–77.
42. Id. at 1378.
43. Id. at 1381; see McKelvey & Grady, supra note 9, at 11–13; see generally NHL v. PepsiCola Can., Ltd. (1992) 70 B.C.L.R. 2d 27 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.).
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Based on this holding, it could be inferred that a business may use ambush
marketing tactics in any way or manner it wishes so long as it does not use the
entity’s registered marks and does use a disclaimer stating it is not endorsed or
connected to the entity in any way.
B. Event-Specific Legislation
A common trend in sports today is for sport entities to place a requirement
on the local governments hosting the event to enact legislation to protect the
entity’s marks and the value of its official sponsorships, causing the
suppression of commercial speech.44 It has been argued that even though such
requirements impede on what is supposed to be free commercial speech—at
least in the United States—politicians have never actually put up a fight
against sports entities in enacting the requirements.45 While this Comment is
focused on the NFL’s clean-zone requirement, it is necessary to discuss the
oldest surviving international sporting event first.
More than any other sporting event, the Olympic Games (Games) are
supposed to be the most pure. There are no sponsor logos or signage inside
event facilities; the only corporate marks seen on the athletes while competing
are the actual apparel companies’ logo, but even the logo’s size is limited.46
Even more cherished than the “purity” and aesthetics of the Games are the
Olympic marks. More than any other entity, courts throughout the world have
ruled against ambush marketers in false advertising and consumer confusion
cases when Olympic marks are involved.47 This is because national
legislatures have enacted laws strictly protecting the use of Olympic marks
and advertising that purport to imply an association or connection to the
Games.48
1. United States: Ted Stevens Amateur Sports Act49
The Ted Stevens Amateur Sports Act (ASA) “grants the United States
Olympic Committee (USOC) an almost absolute right to control the use of any
44. John Grady et al., From Beijing 2008 to London 2012: Examining Event-Specific Olympic
Legislation Vis à Vis the Rights and Interests of Stakeholders, 3 J. SPONSORSHIP 1, 1 (2010).
45. Id. at 6–7.
46. Chris Isidore, Olympics’ No-Name Sponsors, CNNMONEY (Feb. 15, 2002), http://money.cnn.
com/2002/02/15/olympics/olympics_sponsors/.
47. See infra, the discussion of domestic and foreign legislation and application.
48. See infra, the discussion of domestic and foreign legislation.
49. See generally Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–220529
(2011).
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Olympic-related words, marks, mottos or insignia by others.”50 The ASA
does not require the USOC to show any likelihood of confusion—as required
by the Lanham Act—to make a successful infringement case as to the
Olympic symbols.51 The ASA grants exclusive right to the USOC to the five
interlocking rings symbol and the word “Olympic” itself.52 Furthermore, the
ASA permits the USOC to authorize sponsors and other such contributors of
goods and services to use the protected marks in its advertising to illustrate
that it is a sponsor or contributor to the USOC.53 Although the act does not
explicitly reference ambush marketing as a purpose of what it intends to
prohibit, it can certainly be implied.54
The USOC may bring a civil action against an alleged violator of the ASA
“if the person, without the consent of the [USOC], uses [the Olympic marks or
words] for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or
to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition.”55
The subsection also provides the same remedy for any advertising by a
business that gives a false representation of association with or endorsement of
the Games themselves,56 which seemingly protects the USOC and its sponsors
from the most obvious ambush marketing tactics.
However, one caveat to the ASA is the marks’ use must be for commercial
purposes or to promote athletic competition.57 When deciding whether speech
is commercial, a court will discuss three factors in making its determination:
(1) whether the speech is an advertisement; (2) whether the speech references
a specific product; and (3) whether the speech is motivated by an economic
interest.58 In short, the main question is whether the speech suggests a
commercial transaction.59 In United States Olympic Committee v. American
Media, Inc., the United States District Court of Colorado ruled that, although
50. Vassallo et al., supra note 17, at 1350; see, e.g., U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Intelicense Corp.,
737 F.2d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that the ASA’s legislative intent is “to promote the United
States Olympic effort by entrusting the USOC with unfettered control over the commercial use of
Olympic-related designations.”).
51. 36 U.S.C. § 220506(c) (2011); see also Vassallo et al., supra note 17, at 1350.
52. § 220506(a)(2), (4).
53. § 220506(b).
54. Vassallo, et al., supra note 17, at 1350.
55. § 220506(c).
56. § 220506(c)(4).
57. See generally S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987); U.S.
Olympic Comm. v. Am. Media, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D. Colo. 2001).
58. Am. Media, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1207 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 66–67 (1983)).
59. Id.
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the defendant used the word “Olympic” in its magazine titled Olympics USA,
the USOC failed to state a claim under the ASA upon which relief could be
granted because the court found that American Media (AMI) was not using the
word “Olympics” for a commercial purpose.60 The USOC argued that AMI
allegedly used Olympic marks and words covered under the ASA “‘for the
purpose of trade and to induce the sale of [its magazine],’ and to ‘pass off
OLYMPICS USA as if it were authorized by the USOC’” in a way intended to
confuse Olympic consumers.61 More specifically, the USOC alleged that
AMI, without permission, used illustrations of Olympic medals, the Olympic
torch, and other such Olympic-related symbols for the purpose of selling its
magazine.62 Furthermore—and more related to ambush marketing—the
USOC asserted “that AMI’s unauthorized use of its marks will encourage
‘other companies that are not Olympic sponsors/suppliers/licensees . . . to
use . . . [Olympic] marks and terminology without entering into a sponsorship,
suppliership, or other licensing agreement[s]’” and “will ‘likely impair the
USOC’s relationships with its existing and prospective sponsors, suppliers,
and other licensees.’”63
The court, however, agreed with AMI that it did not violate the ASA by
publishing Olympic-related content in its magazine64 because the title itself
was not commercial speech.65 The court also relied on AMI’s disclaimer—as
the court in Delaware required on the state’s lottery tickets—because it stated
the magazine was not affiliated or licensed by the USOC or the Olympic
Games.66 However, it could be argued that the title was commercial speech
because the title of a magazine or book certainly has an effect on whether one
buys the magazine, especially when the magazine is so closely related to an
event such as the Olympics. The ASA is one example of how the United
States protects the Olympic properties from ambush marketing tactics to
protect the branding and marks of the USOC and the Games; other countries
60. Id. at 1202.
61. Id. at 1203 (citation omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1203–04.
64. Id. at 1210.
65. Id. at 1209.
66. Id. at 1203 n.3; but see, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 522 (holding that a nonprofit organization could not use the word “Olympic” in its event called the “Gay Olympic Games”
because the use of the phrase “Olympic Games” related to athletic participation). For further insight
on use of trademarks subject to the ASA, see Erinn M. Batcha, Comment, Who Are the Real
Competitors in the Olympic Games? Dual Olympic Battles: Trademark Infringement and Ambush
Marketing Harm Corporate Sponsors – Violations Against the USOC and its Corporate Sponsors, 8
SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 229, 231 (1998).
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around the world have also enacted similar—and more stringent—statutes to
not only protect the Olympic marks, but other major international events as
well.
2. Foreign Legislation Protecting Against Ambush Marketing
Three years prior to the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver, the
Canadian Senate enacted the Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act (Bill C47).67 The Act’s purpose, similar to the Lanham Act and the ASA, was to
prohibit companies from using “an Olympic or Paralympic mark or a mark
that so nearly resembles an Olympic or Paralympic mark” where it is likely to
cause confusion.68 Furthermore, Bill C-47 also implied that no company shall
mislead and confuse the public into believing that the company was approved
and authorized by any organizing committee, including Canada’s, to use the
mark or in some way be officially associated with a specific organizing
committee or the Games itself.69
Other countries have enacted similar legislation for the Olympic Games as
well: China (Regulations on the Protection of Olympic Symbols),70 Greece
(Protection of the Olympic Symbol),71 Italy (Turin Olympics Act),72 and
Australia (Sydney 2000 Games Protection Act 1996).73
However, the Olympic Games are not the only international spectacle
“ripe” for ambush marketers to profit off the event’s goodwill. One could
argue that the FIFA World Cup is certainly equal to, if not more popular than,
the Olympics. Easily the strictest laws of all, South Africa originally used the
Trade Practices Act74 (TPA) and Merchandise Marks Act75 (MMA) in
67. Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act, S.C. 2007, c. 25, § 3 (Can.); Nancy A. Miller, Ambush
Marketing and the 2010 Vancouver-Whistler Olympic Games: A Prospective View, 22 INTELL. PROP.
J. 75, 82 (2009).
68. Miller, supra note 67, at 87.
69. See S.C. 2007, c. 25, § 4(1).
70. See Anne M. Wall, Intellectual Property Protection in China: Enforcing Trademark Rights,
17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 341, 367–68 (2006); see also Grady et al., supra note 44, at 4.
71. See PHILLIP JOHNSON, AMBUSH MARKETING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE
BRAND OF A SPORTING EVENT 122 (2008) (citing Law 2598/1998 Organisation of the Olympic
Games–Athens 2004, Art. 3).
72. Id. (citing Law of August 17, 2005 No.167, Art. 1(2) (measures for the protection of the
Olympic symbol in relation to the Turin 2006 Olympics)).
73. Id. at 122–23; see also Vassallo, et al., supra note 17, at 1350–51 (distinguishing the Sydney
Games Act from the ASA—in addition to the Olympics’ mottos and trademarks, it included vague
use such as “Sydney 2000” and “Summer Games” as well as “‘any visual or aural representations
that, to a reasonable person, . . . would suggest a connection’ with the Sydney 2000 Games.”).
74. Vassallo, et al., supra note 17, at 1349 (citing Trade Practices Act 76 of 1976, s. 52–53).
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association with the 2003 Cricket World Cup, but the 2010 FIFA World Cup
and its official sponsors were its most recent beneficiaries.76 The laws make
ambush marketing a criminal offense, resulting in large fines and lengthy jail
time for violators during protected events such as the FIFA World Cup.77 The
TPA, like the Lanham Act, prohibits “publication or display of false or
misleading statements or ads implying a contractual or other connection with a
sponsored event . . . .”78 The MMA prohibits intentional use of a trademark in
association with an event when the perpetrator has not received consent from
the event organizer.79 Furthermore, the mark must be used in a way where the
perpetrator received a free unofficial association with the event.80
The TPA was first applied to “ambushers” of the 2003 Cricket World
Cup.81 Two teachers took students, who had Coca-Cola in their lunches, to a
cricket match—Pepsi was the event’s official sponsor.82 Event officials would
not permit the students’ “entry until they peeled off the Coca-Cola labels and
scraped off the logos from all the bottle tops and lids.”83 Security’s conduct
makes one wonder what the event officials’ goals were in this situation
because it would have made more sense to have the students merely throw out
the Coca-Colas, similar to many other sport facilities and events that prohibit
attendees from bringing in soda.
Ambush marketing is a constant threat to the protection of sports entities’
marks and brands, as well as the value of its official sponsorships. The NFL,
by recommending that Super Bowl host cities enact clean-zone ordinances, has
devised its own way to protect the aesthetic feel and branding of the Super
Bowl in addition to protecting its official sponsorship values; however,
commercial speech protection under the First Amendment must be discussed
to determine whether the NFL’s recommendation is actually constitutional.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND THEIR AFFECT ON
BUSINESS BRANDING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Successful branding is one of the most vital business practices a
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Merchandise Marks Act 17 of 1941, § 15A (S. Afr.).
Vassallo, et al., supra note 17, at 1348–50.
Id.
Id. at 1349.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
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company—or even an individual—can use to create a flourishing business or
career. Everyone is a brand, individuals and businesses alike, constantly
branding himself in perpetuity. Successful branding is not merely saying the
right words at the right time and place, it is also advertising to the best
consumer market to buy what one sells, not misleading consumers, creating a
strong consumer base that has knowledge that one’s product exists, building a
reputation for quality, having others stand behind and advocate for one’s
product, and, most importantly, not having others demean the brand
unlawfully through false association or otherwise. The most popular way to
brand a business is through advertising, which is the act of promoting a
product, service, or event by giving notice of it to a public medium.84 Many
businesses advertise in newspapers, on television and radio, but also—and
more relevant here—through signage and vending in public space. Through
commercial free speech, businesses advocate for themselves, advertising their
brand to others. However, such commercial speech is not always permitted by
law or protected by the First Amendment.
A. Constitutional Regulation of Branding: Commercial Speech
Courts have historically treated commercial speech restrictions much
However,
differently than restrictions on noncommercial speech.85
commercially communicative activity, such as advertising, is protected by the
First Amendment in most circumstances.86 There has generally been a
disagreement among the courts about what commercial speech is. The
Supreme Court has suggested that commercial speech is not easily definable
but still described it as any communication that tends to propose a commercial
transaction or, similarly, “expression related solely to the economic interests
of the speaker and its audience.”87 Protection of commercial speech is based
on the First Amendment’s protection of the right to disseminate information.88

84. Definition of Advertisement, OXFORD DICTIONARY, available at http://oxforddictionaries.
com/view/entry/m_en_us1220116 (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
85. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
562–63 (1980).
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Darrel C. Menthe, Reconciling Speech and Structural
Elements in Sign Regulation, 44 GONZ. L. REV. 283, 287 (2009).
87. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
88. Kerri L. Keller, Note, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly: The Supreme Court Sends First
Amendment Guarantees Up in Smoke by Applying the Commercial Speech Doctrine to Content-Based
Regulations, 36 AKRON L. REV. 133, 142 (2002); see Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765
(describing advertising as the “dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what
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However, to have protection under the First Amendment, advertising is strictly
limited to truthful, nonmisleading communication.89 Furthermore, the fact
that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment only if it is both
truthful and nonmisleading fits squarely within the Lanham Act, which
prohibits a business from misleading or misrepresenting its products to
consumers and creating a likelihood of confusion that may result in false
Additionally, when state law is at issue, the First
advertisement.90
Amendment is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and,
therefore, protects commercial speech from unconstitutional governmental
restrictions.91
When an ordinance’s purpose is to restrict commercial speech, courts have
generally favored the government’s exercise of its police power, which
strengthens the legality of subjecting signage or vending in the public medium
to municipal regulations and weakens commercial speech’s protection by the
First Amendment.92 Nevertheless, there are occasions when an ordinance will
not be favored, generally due to a lack of legitimate governmental interests
that are directly furthered by suppressing such commercial speech.
1. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of
New York, the state government enacted an ordinance prohibiting all
advertising promoting the use of electricity in New York State.93 The
Supreme Court held that, although the Constitution does not protect
commercial speech to the extent of other forms of expression, the protection
available for commercial speech depends on whether the speech itself is legal,
as well as the governmental interests furthered by the regulation.94 To
determine whether the regulation unconstitutionally infringed upon the
plaintiff’s commercial speech rights as protected by the First Amendment, the
Court created what is now known as the Commercial Speech Doctrine, or the
Central Hudson test.95
product, for what reason, and at what price . . . [and to] this end, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensible.”).
89. Keller, supra note 88, at 142; see Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2011).
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761–62.
92. Menthe, supra note 86, at 283.
93. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 558.
94. Id. at 562–63.
95. Id.
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Under the test, the commercial speech must neither mislead the public nor
be related to an illegal activity.96 The Court’s intent was to permit
government prohibition of communication that was “more likely to deceive
the public than to inform it,”97 which is a similar purpose—as related to
ambush marketing—for the Lanham Act. If the commercial speech at issue
meets the nonmisleading and legal activity standard, it may be subject to First
Amendment protection.98 The next determination is whether the government
asserts a legitimate interest for suppressing commercial speech.99 Lastly, as
the First Amendment demands, any restriction on speech must directly
advance the asserted legitimate governmental interest and be narrowly tailored
to achieve the asserted interests.100 Otherwise, the excessive restriction cannot
survive.101
2. Legitimate Governmental Interests for Clean-Zone Ordinances
The most common legitimate interests likely to be applied to a Super Bowl
host city’s clean-zone ordinance are community aesthetics and safety.102
Aesthetics lend to the quality of the city’s appearance due to the absence of
clutter or excessive off-site commercial signage, which has consistently been
found a legitimate governmental interest. A municipality’s desire to have a
clean-looking presence is within its police power, so long as such restriction
does not have an ulterior motive in restricting commercial speech.103
Community safety, whether related to traffic or otherwise, is a common sense
legitimate governmental interest. The Supreme Court held that billboards and
signs are intended and designed to avert a person’s concentration, regardless
of whether he is driving, walking, or biking, and therefore, considering

96. Id. at 563–64, 566.
97. Id. at 563 (citation omitted).
98. Id. at 566.
99. Id. at 564, 566.
100. Id. at 565.
101. Id. at 564.
102. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 493 (1981) (stating that the
government’s legitimate interests in its ordinance prohibiting all off-site outdoor advertising signs
were health and safety as well as aesthetics); San Francisco v. Eller Outdoor Adver., 237 Cal. Rptr.
815, 817 (Ct. App. 1987) (stating that, in banning all off-site commercial advertising, regardless of
content, the city’s legitimate interests were safety and aesthetics).
103. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510 (claiming that because “[a]esthetic judgments are necessarily
subjective, defying objective evaluation, [such restrictions] must be carefully scrutinized to determine
if they are only a public rationalization of an impermissible purpose.”).
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billboards as safety hazards is reasonable.104 Furthermore, courts have ruled
that aesthetics, as well as traffic safety, are legitimate governmental interests
after Congress passed the Federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965,105
which prohibits states from having billboards viewable from certain federallyfunded highways.106 Although such legitimate governmental interests facially
pass the third element of the Central Hudson test, the regulations must be
uniformly applied. However, courts have permitted a difference in treatment
under First Amendment protections based on the distinction between on-site
and off-site commercial speech.
3. On-Site vs. Off-Site Commercial Branding
Many courts, including the Supreme Court, have ruled that there is a legal
distinction between on-site and off-site commercial advertising, even though
both may be equally hazardous to safety and equally unappealing to the eye.107
On-site signage includes advertising the business conducted, or the services or
products sold, on the premises.108 Conversely, off-site signs are those that are
not located on the premises for which the sign advertises.109
In Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, San Diego enacted an ordinance
that prohibited all off-site outdoor advertising signs.110 The plaintiff brought
suit to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance pursuant to the First and

104. Id. at 508–09.
105. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (2011).
106. § 131(a) (stating that the purpose for such legislation is “to protect the public investment in
such highways, to promote the safety and recreational value of public travel, and to preserve natural
beauty.”); see Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510, n.16.
107. Id. at 511 (citing Suffolk Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S. 808 (1978); Markham
Adver. Co. v. Washington, 393 U.S. 316 (1969); and Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 440 U.S. 901
(1979)).
108. Id. at 493–94; Eller Outdoor Adver., 237 Cal. Rptr. at 819 n.5; see also Menthe, supra note
86, at 312.
109. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 493–94.
110. Id. at 494–95 (stating that although the ordinance prohibited off-site signage, it did provide
exemptions for most non-commercial signage, including
government signs; signs located at public bus stops; signs manufactured, transported, or
stored within the city, if not used for advertising purposes; commemorative historical
plaques; religious symbols; . . . for sale and for lease signs; signs on public and
commercial vehicles; signs depicting time, temperature, and news; . . . and ‘temporary
political campaign signs.’

Fort Worth, Texas also has a similar prohibition on off-site signage. See FORT WORTH, TEX.,
ORDINANCE NO. 17872-11-2007, § 1, Art. 4(6.405(1)) (2007)).
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Fourteenth Amendments.111 Applying the Central Hudson test, the Court
found (1) the commercial advertising at issue did not involve illegal activity or
mislead its audience—plaintiff sold outdoor advertising112—and (2) the city’s
interests in traffic safety and aesthetics were legitimate governmental
interests.113 Next, the Court held (3) there was a direct correlation between
traffic safety and billboards,114 and that there was also a direct correlation
between advancing the city’s aesthetic interests and regulating signage.115
Lastly, the Court held (4) the ordinance was not broader than necessary
because billboards can create traffic hazards and unsightliness.116 Therefore,
the most direct and effective way to resolve such issues was to completely ban
them.117
An important distinction is made in Metromedia between on-site and offsite commercial advertising—although both are similarly disruptive to safety
and aesthetics. The Court upheld the City’s interest in protecting on-site
commercial advertising over off-site commercial advertising because
businesses, as well as the interested public, have stronger interests in
identifying places “of business and advertising the products or services
available there than it has in using or leasing its available space for the
purpose of advertising commercial [businesses] located elsewhere.”118 In
conclusion, the Court found off-site commercial advertising may be prohibited
although on-site commercial advertising is permitted.119
4. Permits and Licensing
This final subsection dealing with commercial branding relates to the
requirement of permits or licenses to allow commercial speech in regulated
areas. Although the NFL’s bid package does not, on its face, recommend the
111. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 498.
112. Id. at 507.
113. Id. at 507–08.
114. Id. at 509.
115. Id. at 510.
116. Id. at 508.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 512.
119. Although the court found nothing constitutionally invalid with the ordinance as it related to
commercial speech, it did rule the ordinance unconstitutional because it impermissibly afforded
commercial speech more protection than non-commercial speech, which has been held to violate
constitutional law. Id. at 512–14. This may become a factor in deciding whether the NFL-related
clean-zone ordinances are constitutional as applied to non-commercial law, but this Comment is more
concerned with commercial advertising by nonofficial sponsors.
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city to require permits for temporary signage, subject to approval, the bid
package does recommend that the ordinance give the NFL the unbridled
discretion to approve or deny requests for such temporary signage otherwise
prohibited under the clean-zone ordinance.120 Such a provision providing
unbridled discretion to a private-sector company in the public forum will and
should be found unconstitutional.
In Atlanta Journal & Constitution v. City of Atlanta Department of
Aviation,121 the Eleventh Circuit struck down an ordinance because a “grant of
unrestrained discretion to an official responsible for monitoring and regulating
First Amendment activities is facially unconstitutional.”122 In preparation for
hosting the 1996 Olympic Games, Atlanta’s Department of Aviation
(Department) required all vendors to obtain a permit and pay a permit fee in
association with selling their products.123
The ordinance prohibited
newspaper companies from using their own newsracks, requiring the
companies to use the city’s newsracks instead. The ordinance was not a
regulation of commercial speech—as most ordinances discussed in this
Comment are—but a discriminatory regulation of speech based upon its
content. The Department had an agreement for an advertising deal with CocaCola to have its logos and advertising on the newsracks inside the airport.124
Virtually any other advertising on such newsracks was prohibited.125
However, the constitutional question was whether a Department official may
be granted full and unbridled discretion to determine whether to grant approval
for a permit.126 The court held that the person charged with approving
requests for permits must have clear and objective standards in determining
such a request.127 Absent those standards, the official’s use of unbridled
discretion would violate First Amendment protections.128
The Ninth Circuit, in Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Moreno

120. North Texas Bid Summary, supra note 14, at 63.
121. See generally 322 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2003).
122. Id. at 1310 (emphasis omitted); see also Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S.
750, 755, 764 (1988); Desert Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir.
1996). For a more general discussion on the unbridled discretion of permit requirements, see Menthe,
supra note 86, at 314–18.
123. Atlanta Journal & Constitution, 322 F.3d at 1304.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1310–11.
127. Id. at 1311.
128. Id.
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Valley,129 took the “unbridled discretion” rule one step further. It ruled that,
although there were some standards for issuing a permit—”whether a
particular . . . sign will be harmful to the community’s health, welfare, or
‘aesthetic quality’”—city officials may not have the discretion to deny a
permit for ambiguous and subjective reasons.130 Therefore, an ordinance must
have specific and unambiguous criteria for determining whether a permit
request shall be approved or denied.
Furthermore, Desert Outdoor also provided a standing requirement for
bringing a claim against an allegedly unconstitutional permit ordinance for
posting signage. There must be (1) an injury-in-fact, where the claimant has
an actual and well-evidenced showing that the ordinance will be enforced
against him, (2) the injury must be caused by the ordinance’s enactment, and
(3) the injury can be remedied by a favorable decision.131 Furthermore, a
claimant may still have standing even if that party failed to apply for a permit
when applying for such a permit would have been useless.132 The Ninth
Circuit ruled that the claimant’s application for a permit would have been
useless because “the ordinance flatly prohibited [the] appellants’ off-site
signs” located inside the regulated zones.133
Thus, if the Super Bowl host cities enact exactly what the NFL
recommends—that all off-site commercial-speech-related activity within the
clean zones is subject to NFL approval—those clean-zone ordinances should
be found unconstitutional under the First Amendment because the ordinance
would grant the NFL, a private entity, unbridled discretion to approve what
businesses may speak through advertising.
IV. CLEAN-ZONE REGULATIONS
As discussed in Part II, ambush marketing has different meanings to
different individuals. An event organizer might believe that ambush
marketing is morally incorrect and should be an unfair business practice.
However, one successful ambush marketer believes that ambush marketing is
“ethically and legally correct since official sponsors only buy the official
association with a particular event such as the Olympics or World Cup rather
than the entire thematic space surrounding the event.”134 One legal academic
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See generally 103 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 818–19.
Id. at 818.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Moorman & Greenwell, supra note 21, at 184 (emphasis added). Jerry Welsh, the ambush
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simplifies this by stating that “one cannot sell what one does not own, and no
sport organization owns the entire concept of or aura surrounding a sport such
as . . . football . . . .”135 However, the NFL—the most popular United States
sports league136—has been given such power to control who can advertise in
and around the city during Super Bowl Week and, therefore, does own the
local concept and aura that surrounds football’s championship game.
To prevent ambush marketing, sports leagues in the United States are
extremely protective of the value of their official sponsorships. For example,
the National Basketball Association (NBA) requires its All-Star Game host
cities to enact a temporary ordinance during NBA All-Star Week to prevent
ambush marketing.137 In 2009, Arlington, Texas temporarily amended its
already existing legislation to accommodate the NBA’s requirement for an
anti-ambush marketing ordinance during the NBA All-Star Week.138 The
ordinance was enforced for eleven days, banning “temporary signs, tent sales,
projected image signs, inflatables and other marketing activities in an area
around the stadium if [the company has] no official ties to the All-Star
Game.”139 The NFL quickly followed suit at the same venue, requiring
Arlington, as well as Fort Worth, to enact a similar anti-ambush marketing
clean-zone ordinance for Super Bowl XLV at Cowboys Stadium in February
2011.140
A. NFL Super Bowl Bid Package
The bid request package sent to all cities interested in hosting the Super
Bowl requires the host committee to work together with the local government
to create anti-ambush marketing “clean zones.”141 These clean zones
encompass a one-mile radius around the event’s facility as well as “on the
property of area airports, within a 6-block radiu[s] of the NFL Headquarters

marketer referenced in the text, created American Express’ advertising campaign that ambushed the
Olympics by implying an association with the Games in the 1990s. Id.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. See generally MLS Sees 12-Month High in Popularity Among Avid Sports Fans, SPORTS
BUS. J. DAILY (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/142491.
137. Susan Schrock, Arlington to Consider Advertising Rules to Protect NBA All-Star Game
Sponsors from Rivals, STAR-TELEGRAM.COM (Fort Worth, Tex.) (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.startelegram.com/2009/11/29/1798287/arlington-to-consider-advertising.html.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Arlington Addresses NFL’s Needs in 2011 Super Bowl Bid, supra note 11.
141. See North Texas Bid Summary, supra note 14, at 62–63.
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Hotel and around the location of NFL Experience.”142
More specifically, the clean zones must include the following:
1.Temporary Structures – A prohibition against temporary
structures, including but not limited to temporary retail
locations not approved in writing by the NFL.
2.Temporary Sales Permits—No temporary sales permits may
be granted within the clean zone during Super Bowl week[.]
3. Temporary signage- A prohibition against temporary
signage or banners, video screens, electronic message boards,
or nighttime projections of commercial messages during
Super Bowl week.
4.Inflatables- A prohibition against the installation or display
of inflatables.
5.Building Wraps- A prohibition against existing buildings
temporarily wrapped with advertising banners or signage
(except for even-related [sic] signage approved by the NFL).
6. Preventive Fund- If such prohibitions cannot be obtained,
the Host Committee must provide a fund of one million
dollars ($1000000) for the NFL to use to prevent ambush
marketing.143
Furthermore, North Texas’ Bid Summary states that the City of Arlington,
as it did with the NBA All-Star Week,144 “adopted (without controversy) a
series of anti-ambush marketing ordinances in effect for events at the
Stadium.”145 The host committee also agreed to work with the municipal
jurisdictions to support the secondary clean zones at the area airports and for
the NFL Experience, including the City of Fort Worth.146
Fort Worth, which housed both Super Bowl teams and attractions such as
the NFL Experience and ESPN’s Super Bowl coverage, enacted a clean-zone
ordinance that followed the NFL’s recommendations precisely.147 The biggest
difference between Arlington’s clean-zone ordinance and Fort Worth’s is that

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 63.
Id.
See Schrock, supra note 137.
North Texas Bid Summary, supra note 14, at 114 n.11.
Id. at 114 n.11, 115.
See generally FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 19492-12-2010 (2010) (repealed 2011).
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Arlington’s did not permit any temporary commercial speech,148 while Fort
Worth’s ordinance subjected application for temporary commercial speech to
the approval of the NFL’s sole-discretion.149
B. Fort Worth’s Clean-Zone Ordinance
Fort Worth’s clean-zone ordinance was enacted on January 23, 2011,
effective until 12:01 AM on February 8, 2011, the night after the Super
Bowl.150 The ordinance first set out that the NFL “owns, produces and
controls the annual professional football championship game known as the
‘Super Bowl.’”151 Then, the ordinance provided that the purpose for hosting
the Super Bowl in North Texas is to “create substantial beneficial economic
and fiscal activity.”152 As host of the NFL Experience, the NFL Super Bowl
headquarters, and the American Football Conference (AFC) champions, it was
Fort Worth’s goal, by enacting the clean-zone ordinance, to protect the city’s
festive image beginning fourteen days before the Super Bowl.153
Fort Worth found it necessary to enact the ordinance because the NFL
informed city officials that difficulties have ensued in Super Bowl host cities
where there was no regulation of “temporary outdoor advertising displays
visible from public streets or sidewalk[s] in the vicinity of Super Bowl related
events result[ing] in pedestrian and vehicular traffic” safety issues.154 The
safety concern is increased because of the large gatherings of people who enter
the clean-zone area.155 Finally, the last purpose for enacting the ordinance
was to “promote and protect good order and aesthetic quality and to protect the
safety and convenience of drivers and pedestrians in and around downtown
during the Super Bowl XLV and its related Super Bowl activities.”156 This
language set out aesthetics and public safety as likely legitimate governmental
interests that would be furthered by suppressing otherwise legal commercial
speech.
Section One describes the geographical area that constitutes the clean zone

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See generally ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 10-095 (2011) (repealed 2011).
See FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 19492-12-2010. §§ 1(1)–(2), (6)–(7), 2(4).
Id. § 1.
Id. § 1.
Id. § 5.
Id. §§ 6, 8.
Id. § 9.
Id. § 10.
Id. § 12.
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and the activities prohibited within that zone.157 The ordinance prohibits the
following if visible from any public street, property, or sidewalk, unless
approved by the NFL: (1) any “Outdoor Event,” (2) any temporary structure,
unless it is adjacent to the host’s place of business and used for a private party
of less than 500 people, and (3) any “[o]utdoor advertising displays, including,
but not limited to, portable signs, flags, streamers, pennants, banners,
decorative flags, video screens, balloons, electronic message boards, nighttime
projections of commercial messages, inflatables and building wraps.”158
However, restaurant A-frame and window signs are permitted under the
ordinance.159
Although Fort Worth’s clean-zone ordinance specifically stated that its
governmental interests were public safety and aesthetics, the fact that the
phrase “unless approved by the NFL” appears throughout the ordinance
suggests otherwise. Specifically, the NFL used its influence so that during the
two weeks prior to the Super Bowl, other non-legitimate interests—such as
preventing otherwise legal ambush marketing—were met in addition to the
legitimate aesthetic and public safety interests.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FORT WORTH’S CLEAN-ZONE ORDINANCE
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE SUPER BOWL HOST CITIES
Fort Worth’s clean-zone ordinance, on its face, is unconstitutional.
Applying the Central Hudson and Metromedia standards, a court may hold
that aesthetics should not be a legitimate governmental interest because Fort
Worth clearly had an ulterior motive—bowing to the demands of the NFL to
secure the Super Bowl for the North Texas area. Furthermore, the clean-zone
ordinance provides the NFL with unbridled discretion to determine what
businesses may use outdoor advertising. This is in direct conflict with Atlanta
Journal & Constitution. To avoid or defeat a constitutional challenge, future
Super Bowl host cities should not include the language “unless approved by
the NFL” within an enacted clean-zone ordinance.
A. Fort Worth’s Clean-Zone Ordinance: An Argument Against
Constitutionality
This subsection will apply the Central Hudson, Metromedia, and Atlanta
Journal doctrines to evince that Fort Worth’s clean-zone ordinance is facially
157. Id. § 1.
158. Id. §§ 1(1)–(2), (6).
159. Id. § 1(6).
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unconstitutional. Assume that a restaurant owner brought a constitutional
challenge against the ordinance prior to Super Bowl XLV. The restaurant was
within the clean zone, but the owner was going to temporarily advertise—
using legal and nonmisleading commercial speech—on-site and outdoors. The
advertising promoted a beer that was not the official beer sponsor of the NFL
but was a product sold at the restaurant. Furthermore, the beer advertising was
visible from the public street.
Under the Central Hudson test, Fort Worth would have to assert legitimate
governmental interests for restricting the restaurant’s commercial speech.
According to Fort Worth’s Frequently Asked Questions About Clean and
Buffer Zones, the zones were not only “created to protect public health,
welfare and safety,” but to also protect against ambush marketing and selling
tactics during Super Bowl week.160 The interest Fort Worth has in relation to
protecting against ambush marketing tactics during Super Bowl week would
likely be the economic value of having the Super Bowl in North Texas.
In both the Fort Worth and Arlington clean-zone ordinances, one of the
goals of, and interests in, hosting the Super Bowl was to “create substantial
beneficial economic and fiscal activity.”161 If the North Texas Bid Committee
failed to promise the NFL that Arlington and Fort Worth would enact cleanzone ordinances, one could assume that the NFL would look to other cities for
hosting the Super Bowl because the NFL’s interests in having an aestheticallypleasing, safe,162 and ambush-free event would not be met. Therefore, both
Arlington and Fort Worth would not meet their own interest in creating
substantial economic and fiscal activity; courts have previously held that
economic vitality is a legitimate governmental interest.163
Aesthetics are usually a legitimate governmental interest—advanced here
by limiting what advertising, vending, and events may occur on public
property or within the view from public streets—because a city’s desire to
have a clean-looking presence, especially when hosting a worldwide event
such as the Super Bowl, is within a city’s police power.164 However,
aesthetics may not be found to be a legitimate governmental interest when

160. Frequently Asked Questions About Clean and Buffer Zones, CITY FORT WORTH,
http://www.fortworthgov.org/uploadedFiles/Super_Bowl_Clean_Zone.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2011)
[hereinafter Fort Worth FAQ].
161. FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 19492-12-2010 § 5; ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE
NO. 10-095, § 8 (2011) (repealed 2011).
162. Telephone Interview with Dave Weinberg, supra note 13.
163. See Roulette v. Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1447 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
164. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510.
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there is an ulterior motive for having such an ordinance.165 As the Court in
Metromedia proclaimed, “[a]esthetic judgments are necessarily subjective,
defying objective evaluation, and [therefore, such restrictions] must be
carefully scrutinized to determine if they are only a public rationalization of an
impermissible purpose.”166 It could be successfully argued that Fort Worth
had an ulterior motive in enacting its clean-zone ordinance. Fort Worth
effectively gave the NFL monopoly power over the clean-zone area to benefit
the NFL’s value for its official sponsors and to protect those sponsors from
ambush marketing. This was boldly evident in the North Texas Bid
Summary167 and in Fort Worth’s published frequently asked questions
document available on its website.168 Both state that in addition to protecting
aesthetics and public safety, the ordinances were also created to protect the
downtown area from ambush marketing tactics.169
Such ambush marketing tactics would be used not only to capitalize on the
NFL’s goodwill and reputation, but also to clutter the market space. These
tactics would inevitably make the NFL’s official sponsorships less valuable.
According to the ordinance, the NFL may grant approval to anyone it desires
to have off-site and outdoor temporary signage within the clean zone.170
Therefore, because the ordinance permits the NFL, in its sole discretion, to
prohibit commercial speech, aesthetics may not be utilized as a legitimate
governmental interest. However, this discussion does not base its argument
solely upon this issue. Even assuming arguendo that aesthetics would be
found as a valid governmental interest, the ordinance may still be
unconstitutional.
The third part of the Central Hudson test is to determine whether the
clean-zone ordinance directly furthers the legitimate governmental interests.
First, the potential economic vitality interest is not furthered by the clean-zone
ordinance. On its face, the ordinance permits the NFL to grant permission to
itself or to any of its official sponsors to host outdoor events, place temporary
structures, have outdoor temporary signage, or allow temporary vending that is
“visible from any public street, public property or sidewalk.”171 Allowing the
NFL such a unilateral power may still directly further Fort Worth’s legitimate

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
North Texas Bid Summary, supra note 14, at 62–63.
Fort Worth FAQ, supra note 160.
Id.; North Texas Bid Summary, supra note 14, at 62–63.
FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 19492-12-2010, § 1(6) (2010) (repealed 2011).
See Id. §§ 1(1)–(2), (6)–(7).

SLIFFMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

282

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

6/4/2012 10:01 AM

[Vol. 22:1

interests in aesthetics and public safety because the ordinance would still work
to limit all other commercial speech.
However, it can be argued that, on its face, the ordinance restricts
economic vitality rather than advances it. Prohibiting a restaurant located
within the designated clean zone from placing on-site and outdoor advertising
of its products facing the public street may hinder the restaurant’s business. It
would effectively be prohibited from having outdoor advertising promoting
any of the NFL nonofficial sponsor’s beer specials it may have during Super
Bowl week, or that it even sells the product on location. Fort Worth might
argue that the ordinance’s purpose, as related to economic vitality, is to grow
the future prosperity of the city as a whole, and businesses should not merely
look at the short-term; however, hosting the Super Bowl generally has no
actual economic effect on the host city.172 Additionally, any economic vitality
interest would not be furthered by enacting the clean-zone ordinance, but only
by hosting the Super Bowl. Therefore, economic vitality is likely not a
legitimate governmental interest advanced by the clean-zone ordinance.
Furthermore, an argument exists that aesthetics is not furthered directly by
the clean-zone ordinance either. The ordinance allows the NFL, or whoever
the NFL allows, to place temporary off-site signage and vending in and around
the clean zone. There is no limit within the ordinance preventing the NFL
from allowing only a certain number of off-site temporary signage; therefore,
it is certainly plausible that the NFL could grant approval to its partners and
sponsors for more signage and vending than would have otherwise been if no
approval was needed. Although plausible, this argument will likely not
succeed because an ordinance meant to directly further aesthetics does not
have to eliminate clutter or excessive off-site signage, but must merely limit
it.173 Alternatively, a court may still strike down the ordinance on the basis of
the Central Hudson test due to the public’s value placed on on-site signage.
The Central Hudson test requires a determination of whether Fort Worth’s
clean-zone ordinance is narrowly tailored to further its potential legitimate
interests in aesthetics and public safety. Fort Worth’s clean-zone ordinance
may not be narrowly tailored because the NFL may facially prohibit, in its sole
discretion, the restaurant’s on-site outdoor advertising of products available,
which would otherwise be permissible.174 As the ordinance suggests, any

172. See Darren Rovell, What Is a Super Bowl Worth? Good Question, ESPN (Feb. 2, 2006),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs05/news/story?id=2315303.
173. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511–12.
174. See Diaz, supra note 15. The West End Pub’s owner was informed by police that he had to
take down Bud Light signage he had on his property that was outside on his property but faced the
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signage that is visible from the public street or sidewalk is not permitted,
unless approved by the NFL. Furthermore, the ordinance grants the NFL
approval rights for temporary off-site signage, which Metromedia clearly
prohibits because greater value is given to on-site signage than off-site signage
and consumers have a material interest in knowing what products the
restaurant sells,175 which the ordinance facially prohibits. Therefore, the
ordinance may be constitutionally overbroad because it facially prohibits
businesses from certain on-site advertising of their products while allowing the
NFL to grant approval for off-site advertising to its official sponsors.176 The
ordinance would not have been overbroad had it merely prohibited all
temporary commercial speech, as the Arlington ordinance did.
Apart from the Central Hudson test, there are specific provisions in the
Fort Worth’s clean-zone ordinance that make the ordinance facially
unconstitutional as well. The ordinance permits the NFL, a private entity, to
use unbridled discretion to favor its official sponsors over nonofficial sponsor
companies. The ordinance grants the NFL the power to allow its official
sponsors to place outdoor temporary advertising in public areas.177 However,
the ordinance also facially provides the NFL with unbridled discretion to
prohibit companies not officially affiliated from temporarily advertising. As
the Eleventh Circuit ruled in Atlanta Journal & Constitution, a government
may not place complete and unbridled discretion in a government official.178
A logical argument flowing from such a holding is that a government would
therefore be prohibited from placing such unbridled discretion in a private
entity like the NFL. Therefore, Fort Worth’s clean-zone ordinance is, on its
face, unconstitutional.
However, because the ordinance has a severability clause, which states
that if any provision in the ordinance is found unconstitutional, only the
unconstitutional provision shall be removed from the ordinance, and the
remaining constitutional provisions will remain intact.179 Removing the
“unless approved by the NFL” language would leave Fort Worth’s ordinance
nearly identical to Arlington’s. Arlington’s ordinance appears to treat all offsite commercial speech identically and does not give any public official or
private entity unbridled discretion to approve what would otherwise be

public street. Id.
175. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511–12.
176. See Diaz, supra note 15.
177. See FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 19492-12-2010, § 1(6) (2010) (repealed 2011).
178. Atlanta Journal & Constitution, 322 F.3d at 1310.
179. FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 19492-12-2010, § 6.
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prohibited under the clean-zone ordinance and is, therefore, facially
constitutional.
B. Recommendations for Future Super Bowl Clean-Zone Ordinances
In the future, the NFL should not include its “unless approved by the
NFL” language in its bid package requirements. The NFL wants to protect its
official sponsorships’ values and provide its sponsors with a completely
protected platform at the Super Bowl to activate their sponsorships and
improve their brands’ recognition. However, it should not put host cities,
which advance the massive amounts of money to host the NFL’s mega-event,
in the position of enacting an unconstitutional ordinance in order to do so. For
the Super Bowl clean-zone ordinances to be constitutional, the NFL will have
to “deal with” eliminating all off-site commercial speech from the cities
hosting future Super Bowls, and not merely the commercial branding and
advertising of whomever the NFL disapproves.
VI. CONCLUSION
All sports entities go to enormous lengths in protecting themselves and
their official sponsors from ambush marketing and selling tactics. Some have
brought suit under the Lanham Act for an ambusher allegedly profiting from
the entity’s goodwill and reputation, while other entities have persuaded and
lobbied local governments to enact legislative regulations restricting such
ambush marketing tactics. Additionally, many countries have enacted
legislation on a national level to prohibit ambush marketing during worldwide
events like the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games. However, in the
United States, legislatures should be mindful to enact an ordinance that that
will be upheld against a constitutional challenge.
The NFL should not be blamed for flexing its muscle and
“recommending” that host bid cities promise to enact a clean-zone ordinance
during the Super Bowl. The NFL has valid and substantial business interests
in aesthetics and public safety at the Super Bowl as well as protecting the
value of its official sponsorships. Companies pay millions of dollars every
year to be officially associated with the United States’ most popular
professional sports league, and the NFL should flex its muscles to prevent any
ambush marketing tactics from occurring where it could potentially hinder the
value of its official sponsorships or take away from the aura surrounding its
championship game. Allowing such conduct may certainly be detrimental to
one’s brand, and companies may think even harder about whether the
investment is actually worth the price.
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Event organizers must always be cognizant of ambush marketing tactics.
The official sponsors will certainly question whether the sponsorship is
actually worth what they paid if the ambush marketers can profit off the event
without paying the official sponsorship fees. However, as an event organizer,
there is only so much one can do to prevent such ambush marketing tactics.
The NFL, as evidenced by the Fort Worth clean-zone ordinance, essentially
owned the entire concept of, and aura surrounding,180 the Super Bowl’s
festivities area by having approval rights for who could temporarily advertise
in the public space. In Arlington, the NFL was still protected from most
ambush marketing tactics; however, it could not implement its own marketing
tactics as it could in Fort Worth. The NFL, like most sport entities, has taken
on the responsibility to keep official sponsorship values protected. However,
it should use all constitutional means to support its sponsors regarding cleanzone requirements, rather than conducting itself in a manner that may subject
the Super Bowl’s host to constitutional challenge.
Ari J. Sliffman

180. Moorman & Greenwell, supra note 21, at 184.

